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The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause: Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation
The free exercise clause of the first amendment provides that "Congress
shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise of religion.", This provision
offers one of the most fundamental protections of freedom: a shield from religious persecution. The scope of that protection, however, has been the subject
of frequent debate among scholars, and the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court regarding its scope and the tests used to determine the scope
frequently have been inconsistent.2 Thus, even today, when a new fact situation
involving freedom of religion arises, it is not always clear whether the free exercise clause will be applied to protect the religious practice in question.
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery ProtectiveAssociation3 the Supreme
Court held that the free exercise clause does not prevent governmental destruction of the natural state of sacred land that is an essential part of an ancient
Native American religion. 4 Based on its interpretation of the scope of the free
exercise clause, the Court permitted the National Forest Service to build a road
through the sacred lands, 5 despite arguments of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa
6
Indians that it would virtually destroy their ability to practice their religion.

This Note discusses the scope of the free exercise protection applied in
Lyng. It compares the holding in Lyng with previous free exercise clause decisions to determine whether the Lyng Court's conclusion that the free exercise
clause does not protect the Indian religion was appropriate in light of precedent
and the protection intended by the framers of the Constitution. The Note concludes that Lyng is an exemplary case in which a line-drawing rule for the
boundaries of the free exercise clause produces injustice. The Note maintains
that a balancing test is the best solution for an issue as delicate and fact dependent as freedom of religion, despite the merits of efficiency that the Court's solution offers.
The controversy leading to the Lyng decision began in 1974 when the
United States Forest Service first proposed a draft environmental impact state1. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
2. Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,234-36 (1972) (applying a balancing test weighing the governmental interest that threatened religious freedom against the religious interest) with
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986) (applying a line-drawing test to hold that the scope of the
free exercise clause did not extend to cases in which respecting the religious interest would allow the
religious interest to dictate how internal government affairs are run).
3. 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
4. Id. at 1321.
5. Id.
6. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Lyng (No. 86-1013). Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Lyng
discusses the harm to the Indian religion that would inevitably result from allowing the Forest Service to build the road. Under the religion of the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians, land is viewed
as an integral part of that religion-more than a mere place of worship. The Indian place of worship
is unlike the churches of Western religions in which the location is merely a place to gather to pay
homage to an intangible being who is thought of as existing somewhere else or everywhere. In a
sense, the land itself is the Native American god. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1334-35 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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ment for a road to be built in the Blue Creek Unit of the Six Rivers National
Forest.7 The proposed project was to create a paved road connecting two California towns.8 After upgrading forty-nine miles of previously unpaved roads on
federal land, the Forest Service needed to build a six-mile paved segment
through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest to connect
the completed portions of the road. 9 The Chimney Rock area, often referred to
as the "high country," included lands that the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians considered sacred and fundamental to their religion.10
In 1977 the Forest Service issued a draft environmental impact statement
discussing proposed road improvements in the Chimney Rock area of the Blue

Creek Unit. In response to public comments on the draft statement, the Forest
Service commissioned a study of American Indian cultural and religious sites in
the area.1 1 The study concluded that the road would cause serious harm to
sacred areas considered integral to the Indian religion and recommended that

the road not be completed.12
The Forest Service, however, chose to reject this recommendation and continued its plan to build the road. 13 Attempts by the Forest Service to remove the

route as far as possible from the sites used for spiritual activities were not successful, because alternative routes traversed private land, had soil stability
problems, or traversed other land with ritualistic value to the Indians. 14 Meanwhile, the Forest Service also made plans for timber harvesting in the area, a
project that threatened the same devastating effects on the Indians' religious
practices as the building of the road.15 After exhausting administrative reme-

dies, the association of Northwest Indians, individual Indians, nature organizations, individual members of those organizations, and the State of California
brought suit seeking to enjoin the proposed road, as well as the proposed timber
7. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 590 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988). R. Max Peterson was Chief of the United States Forest
Service and Richard E. Lyng was the Secretary of Agriculture. Both men were named as parties to
the suit in their official capacity. Id. at 586.
8. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1321.
9. Id. at 1321.
10. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir.
1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
11. Ling, 108 S. Ct. at 1321-22.
12. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 693. The study determined that the region charted for the building of
the road contained the area known as the "high country," considered sacred by Yurok, Karok, and
Tolowa Indians living in the vicinity. Although specific sites within that area are used for prayer and
religious ceremonies, the sacred area encompasses the entire region, not just the individual sites.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 585 F. Supp. 586, 591 (N.D. Cal. 1983),
aff'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
13. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1322.
14. In support of their argument that protection of the entire area was essential to protection of
their beliefs, the Indians established that they believe that their religious leaders receive power from
the land, power that permits them to fill the religious roles central to traditional religions. Evidence
established that the "unitary pristine nature of the high country is essential to this religious use."
Peterson, 795 F.2d at 692.
15. Lyng, 108 S.Ct. at 1322.
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harvesting in the area. 16
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California
held that the government's actions in either harvesting timber or building the
proposed segment of road would violate the free exercise clause of the Constitution. 17 In reaching this conclusion, the court applied a balancing test under
which only governmental interests "'of the highest order ... can overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.' "18 The district court reasoned
that, in general, governmental action that impairs the practice of religion or
requires conduct in conflict with religious beliefs imposes a burden on the free
exercise of religion. 19 Such action violates the free exercise clause, except when
the government's interests sufficiently override the interest in protecting the free
exercise of religion and the government demonstrates that no less restrictive alternative exists. 20 The district court concluded that the high country was sacred
and deeply "rooted in Indian religious belief."' 2 1 Furthermore, the district court
noted that the "unorthodox character of [the Indian] religious beliefs should not
deprive [the Indians] of the safeguards contained in the [flree [e]xercise
[c]lause."'22 Thus, according to the district court, the Forest Service's interest in
more efficiently providing administrative services to the area by building the
road did not justify infringement on the free exercise of religion. Because the
government's actions encroached upon the Indians' freedom to practice their
religion, absent paramount government interests justifying infringement of this
freedom, the first amendment provided grounds for enjoining the Forest Service's activities.2 3
While an appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, Congress enacted the California Wilderness Act of 1984.24
16. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 690 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988). The complaint alleged that the Forest Service's decisions
to build the road and harvest timber in the area violated the first amendment of the United States
Constitution, the American Indian Freedom of Religion Act of 1978 (AIFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1982), the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61, the Wilderness Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131-36, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-87, water and fishing rights reserved to American Indians on the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation and defendants'
trust responsibility to protect those rights, the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, the
Multi-Use Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31, and the National Forest Management Act of
1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1600-87. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 690.
17. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586, 594 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. -1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1319 (1988).
18. Id. at 592 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
19. Id. (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 594 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16).
22. Id.
23. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 567, 597 (N.D. Cal.
1983), aff'd 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988).
24. Peterson v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 795 F.2d 688, 698 (9th Cir.
1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988);
see also California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at

CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 5093.34, 5093.36 (West 1984)) (categorizes most of the sacred high country as wilderness lands and makes logging in the area a violation of the Act).
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The Act rendered the issue of timber harvesting moot, because it made such
harvesting illegal in designated wilderness areas.2 5 The court of appeals, therefore, vacated the injunction issued by the district court regarding timber harvesting.2 6 The Wilderness Act, however,

exempted from the designated wilderness
area a narrow strip of land that crossed the Forest Service's proposed road
route. 27 Because Congress left open a corridor that would accommodate the
proposed road, the court of appeals concluded that Congress did not take any
position on whether the road should be completed. 28 Thus, the decision regarding construction of the road was left to the courts.
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's first amendment analysis
on the ground that construction of the proposed section of the road would adversely affect Indian religious practices. 29 The court concluded that the government had failed to demonstrate a "compelling interest" in completion of the
road. 30 Therefore, the governmental refusal to abandon the project lacked the
justification necessary for the court to support the government's position. 31 Like
the district court, the Ninth Circuit applied a balancing test in which it weighed
the government's interest in building the road against the harm to the Indians'
religious practice. 32 Supreme Court precedent supported the use of this balanc33
ing test.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, 34 accepted as undisputed that the Indian beliefs were sincere and that the proposed government
'35
action would have "severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion."
Although the dissenting Justices argued that the balancing test used by the lower
36
courts was appropriate, the majority surprisingly declined to apply the test.
The Court held that the free exercise clause did not protect the land that the
25. Peterson v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 795 F.2d 688, 698 (9th Cir.
1986), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 108 S.Ct. 1319 (1988);
see also California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at
CAL. PUB.REs. CODE §§ 5093.34, 5093.36 (West 1984)) (categorizes most of the sacred high country as wilderness lands and makes logging in the area a violation of the Act).
26. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 698.
27. Id. at 691.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 693.
30. Id. at 695.
31. Id. The court of appeals further concluded that the injunction's requirement that the Forest Service manage the forest so as not to burden Indian religious beliefs and practices would not
endorse the Indians' religious practices in violation of the establishment clause. Id. at 694; see U.S.
CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion"). The court
stated that such a policy would evidence neutrality, since the Constitution encourages accommodation and not mere tolerance of religion. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 694 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668 (1984); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
32. Peterson, 795 F.2d at 695.
33. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (weighing the state's interest in universal
education against the Amish family's interest in free exercise of religious beliefs).
34. Justices Rehnquist, White, Stevens, and Scalia joined the majority opinion. Justice Brennan
filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Justice Kennedy, new to the
court, took no part in consideration of the case.
35. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1324.

36. Id. at 1329. Justice Brennan's dissent urged the application of a balancing test and charged
that "the Court's efforts to simply define away [the Indians' claim] as unconstitutional is both unjustified and ultimately unpersuasive." Id. at 1333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority feared the
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Indians considered sacred, despite the Indians' argument that destruction of the
land would virtually destroy their religion-a harm significantly greater than
simply placing a burden on the practice of that religion.3 7 While the Court recognized that the road would interfere with the Indians' ability to "pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs," the majority concluded
that the Indians would not be coerced into actions violating their religious beliefs by the government's conduct in building the road. 38 The majority stated
that the requirement that the government justify actions that interfere with free
exercise of religion does not apply to "incidental effects of government programs
which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no
'3 9
tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs."
Because the first amendment requires that Congress shall make no law "prohibiting" free exercise of religion, the Court focused on interpreting the word
"prohibit."' 40
The majority, in interpreting the word "prohibit," stated that the free exercise clause is "'written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.' ",41
Furthermore, the majority stated that the government simply cannot operate to
satisfy every citizen's religious needs 42 and indicated a fear that a test requiring
balancing between governmental and religious interests would require weighing
the value of every religious belief and practice that any government program
threatens. 43 Thus, the majority attempted to avoid the future consideration of
numerous free exercise clause cases in which the value of each religious belief
44
would be weighed against the value of the conflicting government program.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan interpreted the free exercise
clause as providing broader protection than that afforded under the majority
view.45 He disagreed with the majority view that the framers' use of the term
"prohibit" indicated an intent that the first amendment bar only outright
prohibitions, indirect coercion, and penalties on the free exercise of religion. He
argued that constitutional questions also are raised when government programs
dissent's balancing test would require weighing the value of every religious belief and practice arguably threatened by any government program. Id. at 1329-30.
37. Id. at 1326-27.
38. Id. at 1325.
39. Id. at 1326. The Court noted further that "[w]hatever rights the Indians may have to the
use of the area... those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its
land." Id. at 1327. This statement suggests the result might be different if the road went through
land not owned by the government where a church was located and eminent domain were involved.
It is interesting that the Court also held that a law forbidding the Indians from visiting the sacred
areas would raise a different set of constitutional questions. This statement suggests that the Court
would find a first amendment violation if the Indians were completely prohibited from entering the
sacred area, but that the Court does not consider comparable the case in which the sacred value of
the land is destroyed through the building of a road. See id.
40. Id. at 1326.
41. Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963)).
42. Id. at 1327.
43. Id. at 1329-30.
44. d. at 1329.
45. Id. at 1330 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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make the practice of a particular religion more difficult, even if they do not
actually coerce individuals into action contrary to their beliefs. 46 Justice Brennan summarized his interpretation of the majority's understanding of the word
"prohibit" and his conflicting view as follows:
Ultimately, the Court's coercion test turns on a distinction between
governmental actions that compel affirmative conduct inconsistent
with religious belief, and those governmental actions that prevent conduct consistent with religious belief. In my view, such a distinction is
without constitutional significance. The crucial word.., is "prohibit,"
...a comprehensive term that in no way suggests that the intended
protection is aimed only at governmental actions that coerce affirmative conduct. 47
If the Lyng majority correctly interpreted "prohibit" to mean that the first
amendment bars only outright prohibitions, indirect coercion, and penalties on
free exercise of religion, the majority's limitation of the scope of the free exercise
clause was appropriate. If, however, Justice Brennan is correct that governmental actions which burden the practice of a religion without outright prohibitions
or penalties are also protected, then the majority's narrow interpretation in Lyng
imposes too great a restriction on the phrase that protects Americans' fundamental right to freedom of religion.
Numerous cases prior to Lyng provide judicial interpretation of the first
amendment instruction that the government shall not "prohibit the free exercise
of religion." 4 8 Twenty-six years ago in Sherbert v. Verner,49 the Supreme Court
established that governmental action making the exercise of first amendment
rights more difficult may act to prohibit the free exercise of religion and, therefore, violate the first amendment.5 0 Beginning with the Court's holding in Sherbert that governmental action hindering the free exercise of religion may violate
the free exercise clause, a long line of cases has firmly established that one particular type of government conduct, denial of unemployment benefits for refusing
to work in accordance with an employer's wishes due to conflicts with one's
religious beliefs, violates the free exercise clause. 5 1 Thus, the Court has con46. Id. at 1333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

47. Id. at 1335 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

49. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
50. Id. at 403. Plaintiff Sherbert, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church, was discharged from her job for refusing to work on Saturday, her sabbath. Plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits because she had failed, without good cause, to accept suitable work that her employer
had offered to her. The Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause protected plaintiff from
discrimination on the ground that her religious views differed from more standard views, and she
received unemployment compensation. In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that if the government action places incidental burdens on free exercise not justified by a compelling state interest,

the Government violates the first amendment. Id. at 399-403.
51. See, eg., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (holding that
denial of unemployment benefits when discharged for refusal to work on the employee's Sabbath
violates free exercise clause); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. Ind. Employment Sec. Div, 450 U.S.
707 (198 1) (violation of free exercise clause to deny unemployment benefits to plaintiff who quit his
job after denial of his request to be laid-off because he was transferred to a division requiring him to
produce weapons in violation of his religious beliefs). It is unclear how requiring someone to give up
a sacred time (the sabbath) is different from requiring her to give up a sacred place (land).
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cluded that denying unemployment benefits when one's religious beliefs conflict
with job responsibilities amounts to a tax or burden on religious belief and impermissibly requires employees to make choices between their jobs and religions. 52 Based on this reasoning, any government action in which an additional
tax or financial burden results from adherence to a particular religious belief is
53
clearly unconstitutional.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder5 4 the Court considered at great length the issue
whether the free exercise clause provides protection against government-imposed burdens. In Yoder the Supreme Court expressly adopted a balancing test
in which the government interests were weighed against the limitations on the
free exercise of religion to determine when the burden placed on religion by

governmental action was great enough to violate the free exercise clause

55

The

Yoder Court held that a state statute requiring the Amish to send their children
to public high school violated the free exercise clause.5 6 The Court conceded

that teaching Amish children modern competitive ideas could destroy the
Amish religion. 57 Thus, it held that the imposition of criminal penalties on par-

ents who refused to send their children to school due to sincere religious beliefs
58
violated the free exercise clause.

In Yoder the Court determined whether the burden on the Amish's religious beliefs was great enough to violate the free exercise clause by applying a
balancing test, weighing the state's interest in enforcement of mandatory educa-

tion against the religious rights of the Amish. 59 In balancing the merits of each
side's arguments, the Court considered whether the Amish way of life and reli-

gion were inseparable or independent and considered whether the children's at-

tendance at high school would truly destroy the Amish religion. 60 The Yoder
52. Hobble, 480 U.S. at 141; Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
53. Because financial burdens that hinder one's ability to practice religion have been repeatedly
held unconstitutional, it is unclear why hindering one's ability to practice religion by destroying the
natural state of land essential to a religion would not also be unconstitutional. Society undoubtedly
pays for an individual's right to be employed in a job suiting his religious needs and to collect
unemployment benefits when he cannot find such a job, despite availability of other jobs. If the
government accommodates those seeking jobs that do not burden their freedom of religion, it is
reasonable that the government also should be required to accommodate the Indians by preserving
the sacred lands.
54. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
55. Id. at 214-15.
56. Id. at 218-19.
57. Id. at 218. The Court concluded that:
compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real
threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today;
they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into society at large, or be forced to
migrate to some other and more tolerant region.
Id. Furthermore, there was strong evidence that the state's compulsory formal high school education would "gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs." Id. at
219.
58. Id. at 207.
59. Id. at 214. The Court held that a state's interest in education, despite its high ranking
importance, "is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and
interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause." Id.
60. See id. at 214-29 (discussing at great length the factors to be considered in the balancing test
and placing great emphasis on the importance of the balancing process).
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Court noted that "[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the [free
exercise clause] is that only those interests of the highest order and those not
otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." 6 1 Although the Court recognized state power to police the conduct of
citizens, it noted that the free exercise clause protects some areas of conduct and
62
that these areas are beyond the power of the state to control.
Thus, the Court has established clearly that government action placing an
additional tax on a particular religion violates the free exercise clause 63 and,
further, that citizen conduct cannot be controlled by the state when the conduct
constitutes the exercise of religion and the importance of that exercise of religion
outweighs the government interests." Despite these unambiguous decisions
65
supporting broad protection under the free exercise clause, in Bowen v. Roy
the Supreme Court narrowly interpreted free exercise protection when faced
with the issue of the extent to which the first amendment requires the federal
government to tailor its conduct to meet the religious needs of citizens.
The Roys claimed that assigning or using a social security number for their
infant daughter would rob her of her unique spirit. 66 In Roy the Court declined
to apply the balancing test used in Yoder.67 The Court simply concluded that
the free exercise clause does not require the government to adjust its administrative policies to fit the religious needs of citizens and held that the Roys could not
require the government to change its policies to suit their beliefs. 68 In support of
this holding, the Court likened the facts in Roy to a citizen seeking a require61. Id. at 215.
62. Id. at 220.
63. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
65. 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (plurality opinion).
66. Id. at 696-97. The Roys were Native Americans and, as in Lyng, the religious beliefs in
question differed in their fundamental nature from the dogma of Western religions.
67. Id. at 699, 707. One factor that perhaps contributed to the Court's more restrictive view of
the scope of free exercise protection in Roy is that the Roys' religious beliefs were not as well established as were the plaintiffs' beliefs in many of the previous free exercise cases. The Roys' belief was
a newly developed belief, for the rest of the family had social security numbers. In addition, testimony was unclear as to whether the Roys believed it was just assignment or also use of the number
that would rob their daughter of her spirit. Id. at 696-97. Thus, Roy might be distinguished from
Yoder on the grounds that the religious belief was not so clearly established and thus would not
weigh very heavily, making the holding in Roy the same even if the balancing test were applied. In
contrast with Roy, the Yoder Court placed much emphasis on how old and established the Amish
beliefs were and how clearly the Amish adhered to their beliefs. This factor was very relevant in the
balancing process. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 201-14. According to the Yoder court:
It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some "progressive" or more enlightened process for rearing children for modem life.

Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect[,] ... the Amish
... have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs ....
Id. at 235.
68. Roy, 476 U.S. at 701. The Roy Court supported its decision to reject the balancing test by
stating that the free exercise clause "simply cannot be understood to require the Government to
conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens."
Id. at 699. The Court further stated, "Just as the Government may not insist that appellees engage
in any set form of religious observance, so appellees may not demand that the Government join in
their chosen religious practices .
I...
Id. at 699-700.
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ment that the government maintain file cabinets of a particular color to satisfy
that citizen's religious needs. 69 The Court stated that "[o]ur cases have long
recognized a distinction between the freedom of.individual belief, which is abso' '70
lute, and the freedom of individual conduct, which is not absolute.
The Court concluded that the Yoder test was not appropriate in the setting
of Roy because the government is entitled to wide latitude in its enforcement of a

uniformly applicable requirement-the assignment of social security numbersfor the administration of welfare programs. 7 1 The Roy majority, nevertheless,

discussed at great length the benefits of welfare, as well as the problems of ad72
ministration and prevention of fraud in the expansive social security system.
Therefore, to some extent, the Court
appeared to apply the Yoder balancing test
73
despite its ostensible rejection.

The limits placed on the free exercise clause in Roy seem fair and sensible in
that particular fact situation. Assignment of numbers as a means of record keep-

ing is very "internal" to the government offices that perform welfare and social
security services. The Lyng majority, in arguing for a narrow interpretation of
the free exercise clause that would allow the government to build the road, ar-

gued that Lyng involved the same issues as Roy. 74 In both Roy and Lyng the
Court refused to let an individual's religious beliefs impact how government affairs are run.75 By contrast, the Lyng dissenters distinguished the government's

decision regarding assignment of a social security number for internal administrative purposes in Roy from the Lyng decision regarding land that resulted in
76
external effects.

The Lyng majority, however, failed to distinguish between the nature of the
government action in Lyng and Roy. Although the majority recognized that the
69. Id. at 700. The point of this extreme comparison is that an individual should not, for any
reason, dictate the manner in which governmental affairs are run. Id.
70. Id. at 699 (the Court failed to specify which previous cases distinguished between the freedom of individual belief and the freedom of individual conduct).
71. See id. at 708-12.
72. Id.
73. See id. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
omm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987), indicated that many of the Justices strongly supported the continued
use of the balancing test in Roy. Justice Brennan pointed out that five Justices rejected the argument
in Roy that the free exercise clause was not violated when the government simply showed it was
promoting a legitimate public interest and was neutral and uniform in doing so. Id. at 141. In
Hobbie, Justice Brennan argued on behalf of the majority that afteF Roy the state still must show a
compelling interest to justify violation of free exercise rights and that a balancing test still should be
applied despite Roy. Id. at 140-41. Clearly, the conflicting opinions and substantial numbers of
dissenting Justices in Hobble, Roy, and Lyng indicate that the issue of when a balancing test should
apply is far from settled and may turn on the appointment of new Justices.
74. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325.
75. Id. at 1325-27. The Lyng majority argued that drawing a line limiting the protection offree
exercise at the point at which such protection interferes with the running of the government would
be appropriate. The Court stated that individuals may not demand that the government join in their
religious practices by refraining from the objectionable governmental conduct. Id. at 1325 (citing
Roy, 476 U.S. at 699-700).
76. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1336 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan points out that in Roy
the court repeatedly stressed the internal nature of the governmental practice at issue. In contrast,
Brennan argues that federal land-use decisions have substantial external effects that internal recordkeeping procedures do not have. Id. (Brennan, I., dissenting).
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destruction of land in Lyng and the assignment of a social security number in
Roy both interfere with the practice of the individuals' religion, they nevertheless
supported protecting only an individual's right to believe, not necessarily the
right to practice the religion or to have access to sacred things or places central
77
to his beliefs.
It is perhaps significant that both Roy and Lyng dealt with Native American Indian religions, which differ fundamentally from Western ideas of belief in
a deity. 78 According to the Lyng majority, the situation in Roy is far removed
from the persecution the framers of the Constitution intended to prevent. 79 History clearly indicates that at the time of the framing of the Constitution Indians
were not intended to have the same rights and protection under the Constitution
as white men.80 The Constitution must be interpreted, however, with some flexibility in light of changing times and to take into account genuine religious beliefs of a nature not contemplated by the framers in 1789.81
In many ways the balancing test applied by both the Yoder Court and the
Lyng dissenters presents the fairest approach for determining on a case-by-case
basis the scope of the free exercise clause. Because of the difficulty in establishing general rules and cut-off points in an area as sensitive and varying in dogma
as religion, a balancing test appropriately provides the greatest possible constitutional protection without hindering the necessary functions of government.
A balancing test not only provides the appropriate protection for religious
freedom, as argued by the Lyng dissenters, but precedent also supports this approach. 8 2 In many ways Yoder is more analogous to Lyng than Roy, for both
Lyng and Yoder address situations in which government action threatens total
destruction of the plaintiffs' ability to practice their religions. Although Yoder
does not involve the issue of religious interference with the federal government's
internal affairs, it does contemplate whether the state's interest outweighs a
group's religious needs. 8 3 The impediment to the practice of the Amish religion
77. Id. at 1325. The Court declined to protect the Indians' right to practice their religion by
saving their land in its natural state. The Court, however, was careful to note that the government's
action did not coerce the Indians into violating their beliefs. Id. Thus, the Court seems only to have

protected the right to believe in a religion, and has not extended the same level of protection to the
actual practice of the religion or the place of worship. Viewing the situation in terms of traditional
Western religions, the holding in Lyng could be analogized to a holding protecting a Christian's right
to believe in Christ, but not protecting the right to build a church and attend it on Sundays.
78. The role of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act may also be relevant to this issue.
See AIFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982). AIFRA basically restates the first amendment, but also
states that Indian sacred land and sacred objects are to be protected. Id. Its wording can be read to
convey even greater rights than the first amendment by creating an express federal policy to "protect
and preserve" the rights of American Indians. The Lyng Court, however, concluded that AIFRA
confers no special religious rights on Indians. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1328.
79. See Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1324-27, 1329.
80. See T. CURREY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 195-96 (1986) (deliberations surrounding the Constitutional convention centered on the distinction between a desire to promote the freedom to practice
Christianity and a fear of allowing "heathens" and "pagans" to hold office).
81. See id.; Reynolds, The Burger Years: .4 CriticalLook at the Critics' Intent, 82 Nw. U.L.
REv. 818, 820 (1988); H. Schwartz, Foreword to THE BURGER YEARS xxiii (1987).
82. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1338-39 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
83. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. Yoder addresses the balancing of the state's interest in education
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resulting from mandatory school attendance addressed in Yoder is analogous to
the impediment to the Indian religion resulting from the destruction of ritualistic sites. 84 The Yoder Court discusses the Amish devotion to life in harmony
with nature and the soil, 85 and similarly in Lyng the Indians hold a belief in the
spiritual value of the land.8 6 In Lyng, as in Yoder, the plaintiffs held a strong

and well-established belief. The action of the government in both cases
threatened to destroy totally the plaintiffs' religion-in Lyng, by denying the
Indians access to the central element of their religious beliefs and practices, the

sacred land in its natural state.

87

Prior cases lend strong support to the conclusion that the phrase "Congress

shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion 88 extends protection to cases in which government action indirectly inhibits practice of religion. 89 In addition to Yoder, in which the Court extensively analyzed factors to
be balanced, other cases, beginning as early as Sherbert, have considered
whether the government interest sufficiently outweighed the interest in free exercise protection. 90 Because many prior opinions applied a balancing test in which
the government's interest was weighed against the religious interest, it also
seems that precedent favors the dissenters' balancing test. 9 1 Furthermore, the

"external" nature of the government activity in Lyng renders it significantly different from Roy, in which the government's conduct was entirely "internal."
against the Amish religious needs. For a complete discussion of Yoder, see supra text accompanying
notes 54-62.
84. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214; Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1325.
85. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 210.
86. Lyng, 108 S. Ct. at 1326.
87. Unlike traditional Western religions in which the right to believe and the right to perform a
service in a particular place can be separated, the Indians viewed the land as an integral part of their
religion. Justice Brennan aptly described the Indian faith in his dissenting opinion in Lyng:
Where dogma lies at the heart of western religions, Native American faith is inextricably
bound to the use of land. The site-specific nature of Indian religious practice derives from
the Native American perception that land is itself a sacred, living being.
Id. at 1331 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 54-62 (discussing the Yoder decision in which government requirement that Amish children attend school, something that would indirectly undermine
the beliefs the Amish were attempting to instill in their children, was held to violate the free exercise

clause); see also supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (discussing the Sherbert decision in which
the Court framed the free exercise clause issue as whether the government conduct places "any
burden" on the free exercise of religion).
90. A number of decisions have described the test for a free exercise clause violation as requiring a determination of whether the Government has a "compelling interest" in regulation that justifies violating religious rights. See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 140
(1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
91. This is particularly true in light of the disagreement among Justices regarding the correctness of the Roy decision. See Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 141. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in
Hobbie, rejected the rule of Roy that the government not be required to meet rigorous standards to
justify its actions when the issue of whether government action violates the free exercise clause
arises. He argued that five Justices expressly rejected the argument in Roy that the government
meets the burden ofjustifying its actions and the free exercise clause is not violated if the government
demonstrates that its practice is neutral and uniform in its application and is a reasonable means of
promoting a legitimate public interest. The Hobble Court rejected the Roy reasoning and relied on
the reasoning of prior cases that "'[o]nly those [government] interests of the highest order... can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.'" Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 142 (quoting
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
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Thus, the application of a balancing test seems to provide the fairest basis for
analyzing the free exercise issue in Lyng.
The efficiency gained by not weighing the facts of each free exercise case
individually does not justify the failure to balance the interests in question. The
free exercise clause protects rights of fundamental importance. Because the fact
situations in which these questions of fundamental rights arise are extremely
varied, it is important to examine each situation individually in order to reach a
fair result. The Lyng majority correctly points out that there must be some
limitation on free exercise, and that an individual cannot dictate that the government act in accordance with his religion on the premise that such action is necessary to protect it. Nevertheless, considering the sensitive questions involved in
determining the breadth that should be given to the free exercise clause in order
to protect religious practice, and considering the extreme variety of fact situations and religious beliefs that arise in free exercise cases, a balancing test provides a more pragmatic solution than the narrowing restriction placed on free.
exercise protection in Lyng.
Simply put, the balancing test protects against government action that unreasonably hinders the free exercise of religion-a protection mandated by the
plain words of the Constitution and upon which the premise of our free country
is based. This protection, unfortunately, has been severely undermined by the
majority's decision in Lyng.
The Lyng decision reeks of injustice. The reader senses some injustice from
the fact that Indian rights to land are being taken away, a wrong that has
haunted America's claims of an equal society and free country for years. The
injustice in Lyng, however, is not limited to the taking of Indian lands, for the
decision limits the protection of free exercise of religion, a basic freedom that the
Constitution grants to all Americans. The Supreme Court limits religious freedom with a strict line-drawing test, leaving the Indians, and all other Americans

on the wrong side of the line in their beliefs, without a remedy to protect the
right to practice their religion.
The outcome in Lyng would seem more just had the Supreme Court at least
considered the need and justification for the road before concluding that the
Indians have no remedy to protect their religion from government action. The
Court refused to balance the value of the road against the Indian's rights, drawing a strict line beyond which the Court will not protect religious freedom from
government action. While the line, as first applied in Roy, seemed reasonable
and sensible under those facts, Lyng is an example in which the drawing of that
line renders an injustice. Because this application of a line-drawing test with
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respect to the free exercise clause produced an unfair result, there is a strong

indication that the free exercise clause is not an area of the law in which a line
92
marking the area of protection can be drawn effectively.
ELLEN ADAIR PAGE

92. Since the Lyng decision, several courts of appeals have considered cases in which the standards set forth in Lyng have been applicable, illustrating the ways in which Lyng will be applied.
See, eg., United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988) (following Lyng in holding United
States Forest Service did not violate free exercise clause in denying Sioux Indians a special use
permit to use 800 acres of a national forest as a religious, cultural, and educational community);
Yonkers Racing Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 871-72 (2d Cir. 1988) (applying balancing
test to determine whether government interest is sufficiently compelling to justify taking of privately
owned religious seminary under eminent domain and distinguishing Lyng on the ground it involved
government-owned land rather than privately owned religious property), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
1527 (1989).
The Supreme Court will have the opportunity to consider further application of Lyng this term
when it considers Oregon Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 307 Or. 68, 763 P.2d 146 (1988),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1526 (1989) (No. 88-1213). The issue the Court will address in Smith is
whether the free exercise clause protects a person's religiously motivated use of peyote from the

state's criminal law prohibition of the use of that drug. It will be interesting to see whether the
Court interprets a religious exception to the criminal law as requiring the government to tailor its
conduct to meet the religious needs of citizens. If such a tailoring effect is found, under Lyng, the
government need not accommodate the criminal conduct in the interest of free exercise protection.

